Are Latin America's corporate elites transnationally interconnected?

A network analysis of interlocking directorates


**Author**

Julian Cardenas

**Affiliation**

Research fellow
Lateinamerika-Institut
Freie Universität Berlin
Rüdesheimer Str. 54, 14197 Berlin, Germany

Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
Universidad de Antioquia
Calle 67 n° 53-108, Medellín, Colombia

**Email:**

[julian.cardenas@onlinebschool.com](mailto:julian.cardenas@onlinebschool.com)

**Research financed by:**

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant number CA1271/1-1
Are Latin America’s corporate elites transnationally interconnected? A network analysis of interlocking directorates

Abstract Conflicting perspectives appear when thinking about the emergence of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America. On the one hand, regional political integration, foreign investment growth, increased cross-border mergers and acquisitions, cultural and linguistic homogeneity may have fostered transnational networks among Latin America’s corporate elites. On the other hand, domestic-based business groups, family control and trade orientation to the USA may have hindered the emergence of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America. On the basis of a network analysis of interlocking directorates among the 300 largest corporations in Latin America, I inquire whether the region’s corporate elites are interconnected at the transnational level and form a cohesive transnational corporate network. I found few transnational interlocks, a lack of cohesion in the transnational corporate network and no regional leaders. Corporate elites in Latin America are not transnationally interconnected and so a cohesive transnational corporate network has not emerged. Implications and avenues of future research are discussed.

Keywords: Interlocking directorates, network analysis, transnational corporate network, corporate elites, Latin America

Are Latin America’s corporate elites transnationally interconnected? In Latin American economies, dominance of business groups and significant socio-economic stratification in capital cities may facilitate corporate (business) elite networks within the nations, but it is not known whether these elites are connected beyond national borders and whether they integrate in a transnational corporate network. Over the last decade, examining interlocking directorates –corporate ties due to multiple membership of directors (hereafter corporate elites)– among corporations of different national origins has become a key mechanism for addressing inquiries about the interconnection of corporate elites at the transnational level and the formation of transnational corporate networks (Burris and Staples 2012; Carroll and Fennema 2002; Heemskerk 2013; 2011; Kentor and Jang 2004; Staples 2006). Research has demonstrated the increasing levels of transnational cohesion among corporate elites in Europe and North America,
especially within Europe. However, Latin American firms have remained unmapped in these global studies because few Latin American firms were included in the sample of the top global corporations.

There are conflicting perspectives about the formation of transnational corporate elite networks in Latin America. On the one hand, a transnational corporate elite that is disengaged from national embeddedness and with regional interconnections might have risen in Latin America because regional political agreements, cross-borders mergers and acquisitions, intra-regional trade and foreign investment have considerably augmented in Latin America during the last decade. Together with the cultural homogeneity (Hofstede 1984; 1993; 1997) and the lack of language barriers, a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America might have emerged. Conversely, the prevalence of bilateral trade relations instead of a single regional union, the relatively low level of intra-regional trade compared to the volume of extra-regional trade, the small number of large Latin American multinational corporations, and domestic-based dominant business group structures call into question whether corporate elites interconnect at the transnational level and form a cohesive transnational corporate network. Considering these paradoxical logics, a network analysis of interlocking directorates in Latin America will reveal to what extent Latin America’s firms and corporate elites are transnationally interconnected within the region.

The literature on large Latin American firms and corporate elites has concentrated on the study of national network structures (Enrione and Zerboni 2007; Mendes-Da-Silva 2011; Paredes 2011; Salas-Porras 2006; Santos et al. 2012) and has ignored the configuration of transnational network structures. The present research analyzes the network of interlocking directorates among the 300 largest corporations in Latin America to explore whether Latin America’s corporate elites are transnationally interconnected. The results will provide evidence on how cohesive the transnational corporate network in Latin America is. A cohesive corporate network is characterized by high connectivity and short geodesic distance, i.e. high proportion of transnational interlocks and short distances between corporations. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, transnational corporate elite networks studies are reviewed. Section 2 examines evidence both for and against the formation of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America. Section 3 describes this work’s methodology and
dataset. Section 4 discusses network analysis measures regarding the corporate network in Latin America. The final section analyses the results, expresses conclusions and suggests avenues for future research.

**Transnational corporate elite networks**

Since the late 1970s, scholars have attempted to define and label the increasingly cross-border interconnections between corporate elites and the emergence of transnational corporate elite structures. Researchers initially highlighted the interests of managers and owners of transnational corporations in foreign investment and in building global markets (Hymer 1979; Van der Pijl 1984). These studies described the emergence of coalitions between capitalist class segments and labeled the resulting structure an international capitalist class. The term international was used to emphasize the interstate relations; globalization of business elites was understood as the internationalization process of national-based elites.

In the 1990s and throughout the early 2000s, Sklair (1991; 1999; 2002), Robinson (2004) and Robinson and Harris (2000) popularized the concept “transnational capitalist class” to portray a set of interlocking groups – owners and executives of transnational corporations, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals, merchants and media – whose perspective is global rather than local on a variety of issues; globalization of capitals, politics, technologies and consumers has given rise to a transnational power elite who see its interests in an expanding transnational capitalist system. The term international was replaced by transnational.

The principal characteristic of transnationalism of corporate elites is not that they manage transnational corporations, but they have ties that transcend national boundaries (Beaverstock 2005; Hannerz 2002). The term transnational refers to relations based on multiple sites, and not just a single connection between home base and host country (Morgan 2001). Similarly, in migration studies, the term international is reserved to state-based relations and transnational to non-state-based relations, such as groups of people networking in multiple locations, here, there and home (Portes 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). In consequence, cross-border interconnections of large corporations and directors are named transnational corporate elite networks, which are articulated in specific meeting places (Amin and Thrift 1992) such as corporate boards.
One of the foremost defining features of large corporations and corporate elites are networks of interlocking directorates –connections between corporations created by directors who sit on two or more boards–. Through these networks, corporate elites share common business practices (Davis 1991; Haunschild 1993); recruit members (Burt et al. 1980); boost their careers (Zajac 1988); minimize conflicts (Mills 1956); exchange information (Haunschild and Beckman 1998); exert hegemony (Mintz and Schwartz 1981); restrict access to outsiders (Zeitlin 1974); reduce transaction costs (Granovetter 1985); and influence political, media and social organizations (Etzion and Davis 2008; Marquis et al. 2013; Mizruchi 1992; Moore et al. 2002; Useem 1984). An analysis of interlocking directorates among top firms evidences the interconnection of corporate elites and to what extent form cohesive networks.¹

Network analysis of interlocking directorates among the largest global corporations has been used as a proxy for defining and analyzing transnational corporate elite networks. Recruiting directors who belongs to firms domiciled in different countries connects corporate elites at the transnational level and suggest the emergence of transnational business (or corporate) elites, communities, spaces and class (Murray 2013). Some of the most influential studies are found in the work of William K. Carroll and his colleagues (Carroll 2007; 2004; Carroll and Fennema 2002; Carroll and Carson 2003; Carroll and Sapinski 2010), which shows the transnational cohesion of North American and European firms –the North Atlantic power block (Van der Pijl 1984)– and the isolation of Asian companies. Carroll and Fennema’s research elicited a response from another group of researchers (Burris and Staples 2012; Kentor and Jang 2004; Staples 2006) who employed different sampling and statistical procedures, although they continued to use interlocking directorates as a relational indicator to study the interconnection of corporate elites at the transnational level. These latter studies confirmed the rise of transnational interlocks, the increasingly multinational composition of boards and the different level of regional cohesion of corporate elites. By comparing transnational ties within and between regions – North America, Europe and Asia – Burris & Staples (2012) showed the dispersion of Asian corporations, the strong connection between North American and European firms, and cohesive networks within Europe.
Similar results were obtained when the study of transnational corporate interlocks focused strictly on Europe (Carroll et al. 2010; Dudouet et al. 2012; Heemskerk 2013; 2011; Heemskerk et al. 2013; van Veen and Kratzer 2011). Studies have revealed that the transnational European corporate network gained in strength as national networks eroded. Moreover, the transnational European corporate network is forged by a small set of directors with multiple positions (big linkers) (Heemskerk 2011). These findings were also stressed in research on transnational interlocking ownership in Europe (Rodríguez et al. 2006), which showed the central role played by a small set of large financial firms in the structure of the transnational European ownership network.

The resulting cohesive transnational European corporate network is clearly explained by economic and political regional integration. The initial international trade agreements were followed by common market economic policies; the creation of a single market; free movement of people, goods and capital; supranational political institutions; and monetary union (Hix and Høyland 2011). The current debates and decision-making processes concerning the financial and economic crisis in Europe address the high degree of contagion among corporations and the complex interlinkages at the trade and financial levels (Sheng 2010). Transnational corporate network studies provide relational maps to better understand to what extent economies are integrated, who the leaders are and how capable and vulnerable the corporate elites are. However, despite its importance, research on the structure of transnational corporate networks is rare beyond Europe.

**Corporate elites in Latin America: The emergence of a cohesive transnational corporate network?**

Although studies of Latin American business elites, mostly developed by historians, have focused on reproducing the road to success of rich families or personalities, they are useful to comprehend the economic and political context that brought about the present-day corporate elites. Different processes, not stages, occurred across the region and explain the varied origins of Latin America’s corporate elites: land-holding oligarchy domination during the first part of the 20th century such as Grupo Monterrey in Mexico and Larraín family in Chile, migration of West-Asian and European entrepreneurial families associated to trade and finance during the forties such as Luksic in Chile, emergence of urban domestic industrial bourgeoisie in the mid-20th century.
such as Ardilla Lule in Colombia, strengthening of business groups by privatization of state-owned enterprises during the seventies and eighties such as Slim in Mexico, and the geographic concentration such as the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño in Colombia (Birle et al. 2007; Cerutti and Marichal 2010; Jacobo et al. 1989; Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur 1987; Paige 1998; Palacios and Safford 2002; Puga and Tirado 1992; Salas-Porras and Sandoval 2002; Saragoza 1988; Zeitlin et al. 1974; 1976).

In spite of these heterogeneous historical trajectories, Latin American corporate elites share some common and distinguishing characteristics: strong family networks (Carrera et al. 2003; Silva et al. 2006), ruling positions by inheritance (Beltrán and Castellani 2013), firms managed by the founders (Casanova et al. 2009), political rent-seeking strategies (Camp 2006; Khanna et al. 2007), organization on business groups and pyramidal-type structures (Figueroa 2008; Lefort 2005; Schneider 2013). In the last decades, they become more transnational: studied postgraduate degrees at North American or European universities (Serna 2013), sold blocks of company shares to foreign investors (Lefort 2005) and expanded business operations throughout the world (Casanova et al. 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra 2008). Latin American corporate elites seem transnationally-oriented but domestically-based.

Recent research on corporate elite networks in Latin America has been concentrated within national borders. It was revealed that Argentinean banking associations are typically the meeting room for corporate elites in Argentina (Paredes 2011); the Chilean corporate network is denser than the Argentinean network (Salvaj and Lluch 2012; Enrione and Zerboni 2007); the Mexican corporate network was moved by “centripetal forces” (high cohesion) in the 1980s and by “centrifugal forces” (dispersion) in the 1990s (Salas-Porras 2006); and interlocking directorates are common among Brazilian large firms, and the corporate network is highly clustered (Mendes-Da-Silva 2011; Santos et al. 2012). However, whether directors of large Latin American firms are transnationally interconnected within the region and how cohesive the transnational corporate network is has largely been ignored.

The study of transnational corporate networks in Latin America is particularly appealing because the region seems to be in a standoff between paradoxical and conflicting logical systems in the process of building a cohesive economic region. The evidence both for
and against the formation of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America is presented below.

**Why a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America might have emerged**

Since the 1980s, there has been a new process of economic and political integration in Latin America, which has promoted both openness to North American and European investors and trade and investment activity within the region. The FDI growth rate in Latin America was higher than the global mean and that of developing countries between 1992 and 2008, and the FDI - GDP ratio grew from 0.56% to 2% in the region over the same period (ECLAC 2010). Intra-regional trade has risen significantly in recent decades. Global exports of Latin American economies grew from 126,498 to 828,873 million US dollars between 1990 and 2008, and global imports increased from 95,000 to 763,000 million US dollars during the same period. There was an increase in the intra-regional exports from 12,000 to 138,000 million US dollars and in intra-regional imports from 12,000 to 140,000 million US dollars between 1990 and 2008. Intra-regional exports and imports constitute approximately 20% of the global imports and exports in 2008 (ECLAC 2009). Moreover, international strategic alliances have grown in parallel to cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Latin America in frequency, volume and value during recent decades (ECLAC 2010; Guardiola 2012; Kotabe et al. 2000).

Regional markets, specifically those without supranational political regulators (such as Latin America), require transnational governance agreements, which are not achieved by nation states on their own, but rather by private business elites (Joerges 2005). In Europe, the corporate elites organized themselves in the early 1980s in the European Round Table of Industrialist (Van Apeldoorn 2000), which presaged the emergence of a cohesive transnational network of interlocking directorates. In Latin America the Latin American Business Council (Consejo Empresarial de América Latina), born in 1990, brings together directors of the major Latin American firms. Besides, Latin America is a region with cultural homogeneity (Hofstede 1984; 1993; 1997) and common language – with the exception of Brazil. Therefore, it may be feasible that a cohesive transnational corporate network has emerged in Latin America.
Why a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America might not have emerged

Despite the increase of intra-regional trade, the volume of extra-regional trade is far more relevant for Latin American economies; the USA remains the major trading partner and investor for most economies in the region (Bulmer-Thomas 2001; CIA 2010; ECLAC 2010). Moreover, only a few Latin American firms have become globally competitive. Of the 100 top transnational corporations from developing countries in 2009, only 7 had headquarters in Latin America, whereas 60 were based in East Asia (UNCTAD 2010). Multiple regional alliances and treaties such as the Andean Community (founded in 1969), Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) (1980), South Common Market (MERCOSUR) (1991), Bolivarian Alternative to Latin America and the Caribbean (ALBA) (2004), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (2004), among others, were created to establish a common market, free trade areas and to coordinate economic policies. By 2010, there were 42 agreements that concern 237 bilateral relationships (Baumann 2010). This large number of regional agreements suggests a lack of common objectives among the countries and uncoordinated strategies. All of the above leads to the question of whether regional integration is merely a strategy of zero tariffs on trade.

However, the most significant feature that questions whether a cohesive transnational corporate has emerged in Latin America is the significant presence of business groups in Latin American national economies (Schneider 2008; Lefort 2005; Khanna and Palepu 2000; Peres and Garrido 1998; Rettberg 2001). Business groups – sets of corporations from diversified sectors bounded together in formal and informal ways by a common investor – have historically dominated Latin American economies, such as: Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño and Ardilla Lulle in Colombia, Luksic and Falabella in Chile, Carso and Modelo in Mexico, Vale and Votorantim in Brazil, Techint and Arcor in Argentina, Brescia and Romero in Peru. The combined sales of these business groups in 1996 represented 9.6% of the GDP of the region (Peres and Garrido 1998: 33). Business groups are commonly controlled by families and frequently develop political rent-seeking, particularly in Latin America (Khanna et al. 2007). Close ties with local political elites and dominant positions in national markets makes these groups ill prepared to compete in international markets (Sargent and Ghaddar 2001). The family
and national foundations of business groups suggest that corporations are not managed by foreign directors. Taking into account these arguments, it may be difficult the emergence of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America.

Given the paradoxical and particular business structure of Latin America, it is useful to study the network of interlocking directorates among the largest corporations in the region. Research on the Latin American transnational corporate network structure may shed light on whether corporate elites are integrated at the regional level, help identify the central actors or leaders in the region and reveal the extent to which large corporations and corporate elites are nationally and/or transnationally networked.

**Methods and data**

A social network analysis of interlocking directorates among top firms was employed to examine relational structures and to assess how cohesive the transnational corporate network is. The 300 largest corporations in Latin America were selected for the sample. This sample size was also employed by other transnational-regional corporate network studies (Heemskerk 2013; 2011). The N=300 sample consists of the 200 largest non-financial corporations in Latin America ranked by revenues in 2010 and the 100 largest financial corporations ranked by assets in 2009. Rankings were published by the magazines *Latin Business Chronicle* (2011) and *América Economía* (2010). Revenues and assets correspond to the end of 2010 and 2009. This stratified sample selection is employed because ranking by revenues favors non-financial capital; otherwise, financial firms with large assets and small revenues might be misrepresented. This procedure is coherent with other corporate network studies (Carroll et al. 2010; Stokman et al. 1985; Windolf 2002). After selecting the corporate sample, the list of directors was compiled for each corporation using annual reports as the primary source because this is the most reliable way to identify board members (Carroll and Fennema 2004). Although boards have different regulations and different names – *Junta Directiva, Consejo de Administración, Directorio* – they have similar structures in the countries studied: a single board with approximately nine members composed of both insiders and outsiders.

A systematic and rigorous process was followed to identify interlocks. A relationship matrix was constructed in Excel; corporations are in columns and the individual members of boards of directors are in rows. Then, the name list of directors (in rows) is
organized alphabetically by first name, middle name and surnames. Individuals appearing more than once are identified by the same first name, middle name and surname. Ambiguous cases such as names spelled in different ways, the absence of middle names and cases of second surnames are double-checked with Google, business directories and biographical data available from official company websites. The Excel file was imported to UCINET 6 software, the software package for social network analysis (Borgatti et al. 2002). My student assistants and I crosschecked the interlocks manually. The 2-mode file directors-by-corporations was converted into a 1-mode matrix in which both columns and rows refer to identical types of actors: an intercorporate network (corporation-by-corporation). The analysis focuses on the intercorporate network, which is consistent with the purpose of this paper.

To identify whether corporate elites interconnect at the transnational level and form a cohesive transnational corporate network, board interlocks among corporations of different national origins were selected and labeled as transnational interlocks. Directors who hold positions in firms from different countries create transnational linkages and are the transnational interlockers. This research employs the following tools to discover whether corporate elites interconnect in Latin America and to what extent form a cohesive transnational network: 1) a network map of countries; 2) network-level connectivity and average geodesic distance; 3) the percentage of corporations with transnational interlocks; 4) the number of transnational interlocks over national interlocks in the region; 5) the average number of transnational interlocks per firm in each country; 6) the number of components (the maximal interconnected subgraph); and 7) for each country, the ratio of transnational interlocks over national interlocks. High connectivity, short geodesic distances, high proportion of transnational interlocks and low number of components are indicative of a cohesive transnational corporate network. In addition, by analyzing measures of centrality – betweenness and degree– key transnational leaders in the region are identified.

I consider that a higher level of cohesion among corporations from different countries is sufficient proof that corporate elites interconnect at the transnational level and form a cohesive transnational corporate network. Because the European corporate network is rather cohesive (Burris and Staples 2012; Carroll et al.2010; Heemskerk 2011), our results are compared to those obtained by Heemskerk (2013) in a network analysis of
board interlocks among the largest listed European firms in 2010, which use a similar sample size and focus on the regional level. Europe represents the most advanced regional integration and comparing it to Latin America will permit an assessment about the extent to which Latin American firms and business elites form a cohesive transnational business network.

Results

Prior to the network analysis, a national frequency distribution was created using the 300 selected corporations. National origin is defined by the location of headquarters. Table 1 shows the number of firms by country. The seven largest economies in the region – Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela – are represented in the sample. Brazil stands out; Brazilian firms comprise 36% of the entire sample, followed by Mexico (17.3%) and Chile (16%). Central American economies are poorly represented in the sample of the top corporations.

By collapsing firms according to national origin, the network of countries is mapped whose relations indicate the number of corporate interlocks among countries (Figure 1). The resulting network shows the connection of nine Latin American economies, the seven largest economies plus Panama and El Salvador. The analysis of strength ties shows the peripheral position of Argentina, Peru, Venezuela and Panama on the regional circuits. The strongest ties are Chile and Mexico, on the one hand, and Brazil and Colombia, on the other. The network map of countries reveals the incomplete connection of the region, the weak transnational ties among the national corporate elites and the lack of a central country.
The largest Latin American firms are not widely connected by interlocking directorates. Out of 3084 directors who hold positions on the boards of the 300 largest firms in Latin America, 575 (18.6%) serve on more than one board, and 283 interlocks are created. Apparently, several lines interweave Latin American firms, but only 175 firms (58.3%) are connected in Latin America. This proportion is considerably lower than in Europe, in which 91.3% of the firms are connected (Table 2). The largest component includes 134 corporations (44.6%) in Latin America and 259 firms (90.6%) in Europe. The average distance (6.3) and the diameter—the maximum shortest distance—(19) are significantly higher than in the European corporate network, 3.44 and 9, respectively. Firms in Latin America have great distances to be clustered together; the cluster coefficient is 0.44 in Latin America and 0.23 in Europe. Burris and Staples (2012) reported small-world properties for the European and North Atlantic corporate networks regions: average geodesic distance is 3.34 in the European corporate network and 3.73 in the North Atlantic corporate network, with clustering coefficients of 0.29 and 0.17, respectively. The network of the largest Latin American firms is far from the small-world properties of small diameters, short path lengths and high clustering. Figure 2 shows the dispersed Latin American corporate network with its low connectivity and large geodesic distances.

---------------------------
Table 2 about here
---------------------------

---------------------------
Figure 2 about here
---------------------------

Figure 3 shows the transnational corporate network in Latin America that includes only transnational interlocks made by directors who serve on boards of corporations of different national origins, which reveals the high fragmentation of corporate elites in Latin America at the transnational level, the absence of a core and the great number of isolated firms with no transnational interlocks. Only 57 out of 300 (19%) of the largest firms in Latin America form transnational interlocks, whereas 72% of the largest firms in Europe have transnational interlocks, which indicates that Latin American corporate elites are only slightly transnationalized (Table 2). Most of the interlocks in Latin
America occur within national borders: 80.2% of board interlocks are among firms of the same nationality. The total number of interlocks that are transnational (53) is much lower than in Europe (381). The component analysis identifies 6 subgraphs of 3 or more nodes, 7 pairs of firms independently connected, and 243 isolated nodes, that is, firms without transnational interlocks. Visually, the transnational corporate network is clearly disconnected and without a core. Also, note the low interconnection between financial and non-financial firms (Figure 3). The lack of large banks in the region might explain the lack of regional cohesion that played a central role in the integration of Europe (Rodríguez et al. 2006).

--------------------------
Figure 3 about here
--------------------------

The most central companies in the transnational corporate network, those with transnational interlocks, are identified using betweenness and degree measures. Betweenness detects brokers that connect parts of the network; it is the number of geodesic paths from all vertexes to all other that pass through a node. Degree indicates the involvement of the node in the network; it is the number of ties that a node has. Because the transnational corporate network is highly disconnected, closeness and eigenvector measures were not considered. The number of countries reached by a node through adjacent edges is also measured. Results are shown in Table 3. Bladex, the banking firm of foreign trade headquartered in Panama, has the highest centrality concerning betweenness and degree. The ranking of most central firms is not dominated by any specific country or sector. The limited brokerage and involvement of the most central nodes is notable. The most central firm in Europe has 17 transnational interlocks, whereas the most central firm in Latin America, Bladex, is linked to 9 corporations and 4 countries, which elucidates the fragmentation of the transnational Latin American corporate network and the absence of leaders in the region. Looking at the nationality of the 66 directors who are transnational interlockers, only 12 are from out of Latin America, of those 9 are from Spain. This fact suggests that Latin American firms are not integrated in global corporate network, only partially to Spanish firms, although further research is required on this issue.
To compare the formation of interlocking directorates nationally and transnationally, the number of national and transnational interlocks controlled by the number of sampled corporations is calculated for each country (Table 4). Mexican firms form more than 2 national interlocks on average but only 0.27 transnational ties. Chilean corporations have an average of 0.88 national interlocks and 0.40 transnational links, whereas Brazilian firms have an average of 0.53 national ties and 0.23 transnational interlocks. Colombian firms have an average of 0.55 national interlocks, and 0.52 transnational links. Interlocking directorates are almost not developed by sampled Argentinean firms. The ratio of transnational interlocks to national interlocks shows the different orientation of firms (Table 4). Mexican, Chilean and Brazilian firms are highly and medium connected at the national level, but they form few transnational interlocks. Colombian corporations are the most transnational-oriented in the region, with almost one transnational interlock per each national interlock. However, 16 out of 28 Colombian firms are isolated.

To summarize, Latin American boards seem hermetically closed to foreigners, including to regional neighbors. Corporate interlocks are rarely established among corporations of different national origin, even in countries in which interlocks are common, such as in Mexico and Chile. The few transnational ties among Latin American firms and the low connectivity of the transnational Latin American corporate network indicate that a cohesive transnational corporate network has not emerged in the region.

**Discussion and conclusions**

There does appear to be very low interconnection between Latin American corporate elites at the transnational level. Previous studies have reported the increasing levels of transnational cohesion among corporate elites in the North Atlantic region (Burris and
Staples 2012; Carroll and Fennema 2002; Kentor and Jang 2004), that is, a corporate elite network among North-North countries emerged. The present analysis of interlocking directorates among the top 300 firms in Latin America shows few transnational interlocks, a lack of cohesion in the transnational corporate network and corporate elites that are national oriented. A corporate elite network among South-South countries has not emerged.

The economic and political integration of Latin American economies is not supported by a cohesive transnational corporate network. Trade barrier reductions, market liberalization and international treaties have not generated transnational interlocks. The Latin American market is transnational in terms of transactions but national in terms of management. This is exacerbated by the underdevelopment of the capital markets and the absence of supranational institutions of supervision and regulation in Latin America. Moreover, the international trade of Latin American economies is primarily oriented to the USA – except for Argentina – and the major foreign investors are from the USA or Europe (CIA 2010; ECLAC 2006; 2010; Lefort 2005). Therefore, the major business interests of Latin American corporate elites are not within the region. Conversely, the main trading partners of European economies are in Europe (CIA 2010), which might help explain the high connectivity of the European corporate network.

The limited brokerage and involvement of central firms and absence of transnational leadership have exacerbated the lack of a coherent regional project. Brazilian corporations are not inner-circle players in the transnational Latin American corporate network notwithstanding the high volume of Brazilian firms in the sample of the largest Latin American corporations. The largest economy in the region is disconnected from the transnational flows of communication. Language difference should not be argued to explain the low internationalization of Brazilian corporate elites. Despite the several heterogeneous languages in Europe, corporations from Germany, the largest economy in the region, occupy a central position in the European network with strong ties to French, Dutch and Belgian firms (Heemskerk 2011; Rodríguez et al. 2006; van Veen and Kratzer 2011). It may be possible that Brazil's connections lie beyond the region. Future research should examine the interconnections of Latin American corporations with North Atlantic firms. There might be links between Spanish and South American
corporations, and between North American and Mexican firms because of the high volume and value of trade and investment networks among these economies.

Nevertheless, trade and investment patterns are not always useful in explaining the patterns of interlocking directorates. China represents the second biggest trading partner for most Latin American economies (CIA 2010), but no Chinese director holds a position on the boards of top Latin American firms. Determinants of corporate network configurations are complex, context-dependent and varied (Cárdenas 2012; Kono et al. 1998; Mizruchi 1996) which demand methodological techniques (such as structural equation models and qualitative comparative analysis) that allow for combinations of factors to explain network structures and equifinality, that is, when different conditions lead to identical network structures. Transnational corporate network studies should develop causation models integrating network analysis, econometric analysis and qualitative comparative analysis to trace the conditions of building transnational interlocks, which might be different from those that help build national interlocks.

In general, interlocking directorate practice is employed by Latin American corporations and their directors, but not to build bridges between countries. Corporate elites remain nationally based in Latin America and seem afraid to open their boards to foreigners. Companies become accustomed to the benefits of operating in protected domestic markets – dominant market positions, close ties with political elites and business group support structures – that give corporate elites little experience in developing transnational networks, competing in international markets and integrating foreign investors into management. Despite sharing the same language – with the exception of Brazil – and similar cultural values across the region, business elites are homebound. The opportunities to incorporate foreign management are also reduced by the family ownership concentration of Latin American firms (Lefort 2005).

Latin America is a hotbed of family business groups, in which families typically control firms and family ties among directors are strong (Lefort 2005; Schneider 2008, Silva et al. 2006). When members of the same family sit on the boards of directors of several companies, a relationship between these corporations is created because family members share dinner tables, informal meetings and barbecues on Sundays. Thus, channels of communication, coordination and control are created among the
corporations in which family members serve. Tracking interlocking families – the relationships between corporations with members of the same family on their boards – should be the subject of future research to figure out the organization of corporate elites, particularly in economies dominated by business groups such as the Latin American ones.

Latin America resembles to Asia – absence of supranational state structures, economies dominated by business groups, family-controlled business groups, and absence of a cohesive transnational corporate network in both regions. Burris and Staples (2012) analyzed the 112 largest Asian firms – mostly from Japan – and found no transnational ties within the region and very few transnational interlocks linking Asia to the Western regions. Even though, specific studies on Asian countries insisted on the lower density of national corporate networks and that interlocking directorates primarily occur within business groups (Cárdenas 2012; Chan 2004; Naudet and Dubost 2014). This fact illustrates one of the distinguishing features between Latin American and Asian nations: national corporate networks in Mexico and Chile are highly connected, which suggest that business groups are linked to each other, whereas Japanese, Malaysian, and Indian business groups are not linked to each other. The intriguing question for future research is why business groups are interrelated to each other in some countries, and not in others.

The development of a cohesive transnational corporate network in Latin America is not expected in the short term because the transnationalization of boards requires time and – most importantly – a different orientation of family business groups. The growth of multilatinas (TNCs from Latin America) (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008) and the trade and investment orientation of Latin American firms to southeast Asian and Arab countries may change the orientation of corporate elite networking. If Latin American corporations wish to improve their competitiveness in the global market, the formation of a cohesive transnational corporate network may be required. Corporate networks provide opportunities for coordination, collaboration and cooperation, which are fundamental tasks for firms not used to compete at the global level.

Acknowledgements
This research was financed by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) with grant number CA: 1272/1-1. I thank to Josep Rodriguez, Cesar Guzman, Christian Oltra, Gabriel Vélez, members of the Politics and Interlocking Directorates Research Community, and anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions, and to Carlos Sanchez and Ana Lopez for their assistance in the data collection.

References


ECLAC (2010) *Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2009*, Santiago de Chile: ECLAC


Figure 1. Network map of countries based on transnational interlocks.

1 or more transnational interlocks

Nodes: countries; Tie strength: number of transnational interlocks

More than 3 transnational interlocks

More than 6 transnational interlocks
Figure 2. Corporate network in Latin America, national and transnational interlocks

Simple line: national interlock; Strength line: transnational interlock

Figure 3. Transnational corporate network in Latin America, only transnational interlocks

Black nodes: financial firms; Grey nodes: non-financial firms
Table 1. Distribution of large corporations by country*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of corporations</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Size of the economy (GDP $US-billion, 2012) †</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2,253,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>1,178,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>269.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>369.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>475.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>381.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>203.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*National origin is defined by location of headquarter; † (World Bank 2013)
Table 2. Comparison of corporate network between Latin America and Europe, all firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year of data</strong></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firms with interlocks (connected)</strong></td>
<td>175 (58.3%)</td>
<td>261 (91.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total interlocks (dichotomous lines)</strong></td>
<td>283</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National interlocks</strong></td>
<td>227 (80.2%)</td>
<td>586 (61.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational interlocks</strong></td>
<td>53 (19.8%)</td>
<td>381 (39.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firms in the main component</strong></td>
<td>134 (44.6%)</td>
<td>259 (90.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diameter</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average distance</strong></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.44†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average clustering coefficient</strong></td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.23†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firms with transnational interlocks</strong></td>
<td>57 (19%)</td>
<td>206 (72%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reported by Heemskerk (2013); † Results reported by (Heemskerk et al. 2013)

Table 3. Most central firms in the transnational corporate network, firms with transnational interlocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
<th>Degree 1 step</th>
<th>Reachability at 1 step *</th>
<th>Number of countries reached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bladex (PAN)</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.1 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banco de Chile (CHI)</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.4 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTEEP (BRA)</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avianca (COL)</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TIM (BRA)</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telmex Int. (MEX)</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.4 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Telefonica Colombia (COL)</strong></td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.7 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reachability = node degree / n-1; n: connected actors, 57
Table 4. Comparison of corporate networks among Latin American countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Firms with interlocks (connected)</th>
<th>National interlocks per firm</th>
<th>Transnational interlocks per firm</th>
<th>Ratio transitional interlocks to national interlocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>54 (50.0%)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40 (76.9%)</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36 (75.0%)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14 (48.3%)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2 (9.5%)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 A caveat: other ties such as kinship relations, meetings and gatherings in social clubs are also essential corporate elite networking patterns and useful to analyze inter-corporate networks, but systematic data collection is extremely difficult due to the informal nature of these interactions and the lack of transparency.